Mission Intelligence Systems
Risk · Authority

Who Controls Contingency, the Owner or the Contractor?

Most disputes about this are not disputes. They are two definitions colliding.

Ask an owner and a contractor who controls contingency and you will often get two confident, incompatible answers, both correct within their own framework. That is not a negotiating problem. It is a vocabulary problem with money attached.

Published

Key Takeaways

Research foundation

The definitional conflict is documented in a 2026 review in Risks. The behavioural finding, that release decisions are driven substantially by managerial pressure rather than project metrics, is from Ayub, Thaheem and Ullah (2019), with Ford (2002) modelling the effect of release policy. Agency practice comes from FTA Oversight Procedure 40, WSDOT policy, and DOE guidance, with the caveat that the DOE material cited is training rather than directive. The Four A's are the executive lens applied to that evidence.

The conversation usually happens late, under pressure, when something has gone wrong and someone needs money. That is the worst possible moment to discover that the two parties have been using the same word to mean different things for eighteen months.

Why does the same word mean opposite things?

Because the frameworks were built to answer different institutional questions, and nobody reconciled them.

A 2026 review in Risks examined management reserves in United States government construction cost estimation and documents that GAO and the Department of Energy use the two central terms in effectively opposite senses. GAO associates contingency with unknown unknowns and management reserve with known unknowns; DOE's usage inverts that relationship. Both are internally coherent. Neither is wrong. A programme that inherits language from one and governance from the other cannot explain, under scrutiny, what its own reserve is for.

DOE's own training material adds a second distinction that is genuinely useful, and it is structural rather than semantic: management reserve is described as an amount of the total contract or project budget set aside for management control purposes by the contractor, while contingency is funds, not budget, held by the department outside the negotiated project scope, schedule and budget values. Note that this is training material rather than a directive, so it is weak as citable authority even though it is clear.

What is the workable pattern?

Separate the pots and name the holder of each. The distinction that survives contact with a real project is not unknown versus known unknowns, which people argue about endlessly, but who carries which risk.

The party carrying delivery risk holds a reserve inside the contract, drawn against execution variance within agreed scope. The party carrying funding risk holds a reserve outside the contract, drawn against scope change, external events and the possibility that the whole estimate was optimistic. Neither can quietly consume the other, and each has a named owner who can be asked what it is for.

Washington State DOT shows one institutional form of this. Its policy sets a legislative budget value and a lower operational value, at the 60th and 40th percentiles for projects under 100 million dollars and the 50th and 30th above that, and treats the difference between them explicitly as the project risk reserve. The reserve is visible, bounded, and separated from the working target, which makes drawing on it or returning it an event with a name.

FTA approaches it from the other end, requiring the sponsor to work from a stripped and adjusted base cost estimate with contingency removed before the risk model runs. That is the same principle applied to construction of the number rather than to its governance: contingency that cannot be located cannot be governed.

What happens when nobody owns it?

The reserve does not sit neutrally. It drifts toward being held, and then toward being spent late and defensively.

Ayub, Thaheem and Ullah examined contingency release decisions during execution and found managerial pressure to be a substantial driver, operating largely independently of objective project metrics. Ford had earlier modelled contingency management as a policy choice, comparing aggressive and conservative release strategies and showing that the choice has real consequences for project objectives. Put together: the decision is being made routinely, it matters, and it is frequently not being made on the analysis.

The incentive structure explains it without needing to assume anyone is behaving badly. Release contingency early and you own the decision if something later goes wrong. Hold it and no one is ever blamed for money that sat idle, because idle money does not generate an incident. Absent an explicit rule, every individual actor is behaving rationally and the aggregate outcome is capital held hostage.

What does a release authority actually look like?

Three sentences in the governance document, decided before the first request arrives.

Who may authorize a draw or a return, at what threshold, and by what escalation route above it. What evidence must accompany the request, which for a return should be a re-run of the model showing the required amount has fallen because named uncertainty resolved. And who is informed afterwards, so the decision is visible rather than absorbed.

Add a floor if the project is federally funded, because FTA requires preserved contingency curves defining minimum levels to be held as a function of project advancement. The floor and the release rule are complements: the floor stops premature depletion, the rule stops indefinite hoarding. Neither one alone produces managed contingency, which is the fuller argument in Releasing Contingency as Risks Retire.

Why is this an Authority problem?

Because everything here that could be solved by analysis already has been, and the behaviour has not changed.

A programme can know its P65, know its drawdown floor, and know precisely how much its reserve should have fallen this quarter, and still not move a dollar, because no one holds the standing to act on any of it. Naming a risk owner without giving that person authority produces the appearance of accountability and none of the substance, which is the argument in Risk Ownership Without Authority. Contingency is that pattern in its most measurable form, because the unmanaged asset has a number attached and appears on a report every month.

The diagnostic takes a minute. Ask three people who can authorize returning contingency to the organization. Three different answers, or the same hesitant one three times, tells you the reserve is being stored rather than managed.

Evidence matrix

ClaimEvidence tierSource
GAO and DOE define contingency and management reserve inverselyPeer reviewed reviewRothwell (2026), Risks 14(5)
Release decisions track managerial pressure, not project metricsPeer reviewedAyub, Thaheem & Ullah (2019), Project Management Journal 50(6)
Release policy materially affects project objectivesPeer reviewedFord (2002), JCEM 128(1)
Reserve can be structured as a visible gap between funded percentilesGovernment policyWSDOT Policy Statement P 2047.00 (2017)
Contingency must be stripped from the baseline before modellingGovernment requirementFTA Oversight Procedure 40 (October 2023)
Unassigned authority defaults to holding, not to neutralityFour A's interpretationBuilders Build, Authority

What to do with this

Before the next contingency conversation, write down what your organization means by contingency and by management reserve, in one sentence each, and check whether the other party would sign the same two sentences. If they would not, you do not yet have a disagreement about money. You have a disagreement about words, and it is far cheaper to settle now.

References

  1. Rothwell, Geoffrey. “A Review of Management Reserves in U.S. Government Construction Cost Estimation.” Risks, vol. 14, no. 5, 2026, article 118. doi.org/10.3390/risks14050118. Recent publication; confirm final status before relying on it in a deliverable.
  2. Ayub, Bilal, Muhammad Jamaluddin Thaheem, and Fahim Ullah. “Contingency Release During Project Execution: The Contractor's Decision-Making Dilemma.” Project Management Journal, vol. 50, no. 6, 2019, pp. 734–748. doi.org/10.1177/8756972819848250.
  3. Ford, David N. “Achieving Multiple Project Objectives Through Contingency Management.” Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, vol. 128, no. 1, 2002, pp. 30–39. doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9364(2002)128:1(30).
  4. Federal Transit Administration. Oversight Procedure 40: Risk and Contingency Review. U.S. Department of Transportation, October 2023. transit.dot.gov.
  5. Washington State Department of Transportation. Policy Statement P 2047.00: Estimating Project Budget and Uncertainty. Effective 20 March 2017. wsdot.wa.gov.
  6. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Project Management. EVMS Training Snippet 4.3: Management Reserve Versus Contingency and Budget Versus Funds. Posted 9 December 2015. energy.gov. Training material rather than a directive; the governing documents are DOE O 413.3B and DOE G 413.3-7A.
  7. U.S. Government Accountability Office. Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. GAO-20-195G, March 2020. gao.gov/products/gao-20-195g.
  8. AACE International. Recommended Practice No. 40R-08: Contingency Estimating, General Principles, Rev. 25 June 2008, and No. 70R-12: Principles of Schedule Contingency Management, Rev. 16 October 2013. Cited for scope and applicability; available to AACE members.
  9. International Organization for Standardization. Risk Management: Guidelines. ISO 31000:2018. iso.org/standard/65694.html.
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About the Author

Dan Flynn

Creator of The Four A's of Organizational Readiness™ · Enterprise Transformation Executive · Author, Builders Build

Dan Flynn has spent thirty years inside federal, defense, and commercial organizations: diagnosing the invisible conditions that determine whether capable people produce extraordinary results. He is the creator of The Four A's of Organizational Readiness™ framework, has reached more than 11,000 professionals across corporate, civic, and national security contexts, and took a federal data platform from one release every six months to seventy-two every two weeks by changing organizational conditions: not people.

His book, Builders Build: The Four A’s of Organizational Readiness™, is forthcoming.